


































Bank ownership, firm value and firm capital 
structure in Europe 
 
 























We investigate whether or not banks play a positive role in the ownership structure
of European listed ￿rms. We distinguish between banks and other institutional
investors as shareholders and examine empirically the relationship beween ￿nancial
institution ownership and the performance of the ￿rms in which they hold equity.
Our main ￿nding is that after controlling for the capital structure decision of the
￿rms and the ownership decision of ￿nancial institutions in a simultaneous equations
model, we ￿nd that there is a negative relationship between ￿nancial institution
ownership and the market value of ￿rms, measured as the Tobin￿ s Q. This is in
contradiction with the monitoring hypothesis.
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11 Introduction
We investigate whether or not banks play a positive role in the owner-
ship structure of European listed ￿rms. How broad should the scope of banks
in a modern economy be? One of the aspects of this question is related to
bank involvement in the ownership and corporate governance of non-￿nancial
￿rms. Should the role of banks be restricted to ￿nancial intermediation or
do banks also have a role to play as shareholders of non-￿nancial corpora-
tions? We empirically examine the relationship between bank ownership and
the performance of the ￿rms in which they act as shareholders. In particular,
we investigate whether or not banks and institutional investors add value by
being shareholders in non-￿nancial ￿rms.
Research in the 1980s and 1990s concluded that German and Japanese ￿rms
bene￿ted from the active involvement of their main bank in their corporate
governance. This was part of the rationale for the deregulation of the banking
systems in Europe. The Second Banking Directive of 1989 contains provisions
allowing all banks to pursue strategies leading to a German-style universal
bank. Banks can hold equity stakes in non-￿nancial ￿rms, be it subject to cer-
tain regulatory limits. Simultaneously, institutional investors such as mutual
funds and pension funds have become more important as owners of corporate
equity. Institutional investments in world equity markets have grown sub-
stantially in recent decades to such a degree that ￿nancial institutions have
emerged as the largest investor class in many countries. According to the Eu-
ropean Federation of Asset Managers, Europe represents the second largest
asset management market in the world, next to the US. At the end of 2006,
the assets managed by the European asset management industry amounted
2to 13.5 trillion euro.
We distinguish between banks and other institutional investors as sharehold-
ers of a large sample of listed European ￿rms. Banks, and the bank trusts they
manage, are treated as a separate group as well as institutional investors, such
as mutual funds, pension funds trusts, private equity ￿rms, ￿nancial companies
and insurance companies. Banks can hold both debt and equity in corpora-
tions. This combination may give banks additional power in the disciplining
of corporate management. Institutional investors can only use the powers at-
tached to their equity stakes to exert in￿ uence. Therefore, in the remainder of
the paper, we use the distinction between banks and institutional investors.
We focus on the e⁄ect of bank and institutional investor ownership on the
external ￿nancing behavior and the long-term stock market valuation of the
corporations.
The e⁄ect of ownership on ￿rm value remains a key issue in corporate gover-
nance ever since Berle and Means￿(1933) thesis that concentrated ownership
is positive for ￿rm value maximization. However, the association between con-
centrated ownership and ￿rm value is not undisputed. Thomsen et al. (2006)
￿nd a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and ￿rm value in
continental Europe. Several studies have focused their attention on the im-
pact of institutional ownership. Li et al. (2006) show that bank holdings are
largely driven by a series of macroeconomic indicators identi￿ed in the law
and ￿nance literature. Chen et al. (2007) ￿nd that monitoring is more costly
for banks than for independent institutions such as mutual fund managers
and investment advisers. Ferreira and Matos (2008) use total stockholdings
of ￿nancial institutions and ￿nd that banks have no discernable impact on
￿rm value. The impact of institutional shareholdings on ￿rm leverage has re-
3ceived considerably less attention. Much of the focus has been directed towards
leverage and insider shareholdings. However, Mahrt-Smith (2005) shows that
a judicious empirical analysis should include both the ownership structure and
the capital structure features of ￿rms, because omitting one or the other could
lead to biased results. Empirically McConnell and Servaes (1995), Brailsford,
Oliver and Pua (2002), Dri¢ eld et al. (2007) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008)
take leverage explicitly into account.
Consequently, in our empirical setup we explore three relationships simul-
taneously. The ￿rst is the link between the ownership structure of ￿rms and
their performance, measured as the Tobin￿ s Q. The second is the relationship
between ownership and the ￿rm-speci￿c or institutional determinants. Since
leverage may serve as a disciplining device, a third association is that between
the observed leverage of a ￿rm and its ownership structure, obviously with
a special focus on banks, since they can hold both debt and equity. Hence,
we analyse the following questions. What are the determinants of bank and
institutional investor ownership in non-￿nancial ￿rms? What is the e⁄ect on
the long-run corporate performance (measured as Tobin￿ s q) of bank versus in-
stitutional investor ownership? What are the interactions between ownership,
leverage and Q.
We use a panel of 2851 listed non-￿nancial ￿rms from EU15 for the period
1997-2006, leading to 13046 ￿rm-year observations. For this sample of ￿rms
we combine balance sheet data (Amadeus) with market data (Datastream and
Worldscope) and ownership data (Amadeus and Li et al. (2006)).
Our main ￿nding is a negative and signi￿cant relationship between the
degree of ￿nancial institution ownership and the value of ￿rms in terms of
4Tobin￿ s Q, implying that increased ￿nancial institution shareholding has a
negative e⁄ect on shareholder value.
In the next section we review the literature and state the main hypotheses.
We then present our data on listed non-￿nancial ￿rms, focusing on their own-
ership structure. In section 4 we examine the determinants of bank ownership
and the impact of bank versus institutional investor ownership on ￿rm value
and leverage. We integrate these analyses in a simultaneous equation model.
We conclude in Section 6 and discuss broader implications of our ￿ndings.
2 Literature and hypotheses
Why would banks and institutional investors acquire ownership stakes in
non-￿nancial corporations? And what is the e⁄ect of their involvement in cor-
porate governance on the performance of the ￿rms? We review several strands
of the literature related to these questions. First, the activities of ￿nancial
institutions as shareholders have to be considered within the general gover-
nance and regulatory framework. Second, we review papers that investigate
the role of ￿nancial institutions as shareholders. Third, we analyse whether or
not these investors have an impact on the performance of the ￿rms in which
they hold equity stakes. Finally, we examine the role of leverage as one of the
potential avenues for the disciplining of management.
Imperfections in capital, labor, and corporate control markets have made
alternative sources of monitoring to inside monitoring by management neces-
sary to mitigate agency con￿ icts within ￿rms. Hence, from a corporate gov-
ernance perspective, investigating the e⁄ects of concentrated shareholdings is
5important because large equity stakes should provide an incentive to monitor
(Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). However, the free-rider problem, regulatory in-
vestment limits, as well as a preference for diversi￿cation and liquidity may
make the acquisition of such equity stakes costly. Therefore, if ￿nancial insti-
tutions want to be large shareholders they will examine the trade-o⁄ between
the gains and the costs associated with concentrated shareholdings. Li et al.
(2006) compare concentrated equity positions of ￿nancial institutions across
countries and ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences in the extent to which they elect to
become large shareholders. They attribute these di⁄erences to regulatory cor-
porate governance features such as shareholder protection, law enforcement
and corporate disclosure requirements. When shareholder rights are stronger,
when legal enforcement is more e¢ cient, when there is greater access to voting
right, or when ￿nancial disclosure is more extensive, ￿nancial institutions will
tend to have large shareholdings. In other words, ownership concentration of
￿nancial institutions is to some extent complementary to shareholder protec-
tion. A result also found theoretically by Burkart and Panunzi (2006) who
demonstrate that legal provisions can be a substitute for monitoring. Li et al.
(2006) conclude that strong governance environments act to strengthen moni-
toring ability such that more institutions are encouraged to hold concentrated
equity positions. Hence, when we investigate the determinants of bank and
institutional investor shareholdings, we will include measures of legal qual-
ity and disclosure standards. Since we focus on ￿rms headquartered in the
European Union, regulatory di⁄erences are not expected to play a major role.
Hypothesis : Legal regime quality and disclosure quality should have a pos-
itive e⁄ect on bank ownership of ￿rms.
The key issue is whether or not concentrated ownership has an observable
6e⁄ect on ￿rm value. Holderness (2003) surveys the literature on the impact of
outside (i.e., non-management) blockholders on ￿rm value. He concludes that
the evidence for the U.S. indicates that the relationship is sometimes negative,
sometimes positive, but never very pronounced. McConnell and Servaes (1990)
detect a positive relationship between Tobin￿ s Q and the fraction of shares
owned by institutions. The U.S. evidence does suggest that blockholders can
enjoy signi￿cant private bene￿ts of control. A number of studies document
that block trades are typically priced at a premium to the exchange price,
consistent with blockholders expecting bene￿ts that are not available to other
shareholders ( Barclay and Holderness (1989)). Thomsen et al. (2006) examine
the relationship between blockholder ownership and the values of the largest
companies in the European Union and the U.S. They ￿nd a negative associ-
ation between blockholder ownership and ￿rm value in Continental Europe,
where ownership concentration is typically higher, the level of investor pro-
tection is lower, and in￿ uential blockholders may have objectives other than
shareholder value. They ￿nd no signi￿cant association between blockholder
ownership and prior or subsequent ￿rm value in either the U.S. or the U.K
which they interpret as evidence for con￿ icts of interest between blockholders
and minority investors.
Hypothesis : Blockholder ownership has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on ￿rm value.
The focus of this study is the investigation of the value added of banks
as shareholders and compare this to the e⁄ect of other institutional investor
ownership on ￿rm value. It has been asserted that banks may play a special
role in the corporate governance of ￿rms because they can combine debt and
equity. Banks have an incentive to monitor corporations to which they lend,
especially when there is a main bank/￿rm relationship. Moreover, banks may
7obtain valuable information from their involvement in lending to non-￿nancial
￿rms, information that they can use in their monitoring role as shareholder.
If there is complementarity between bank shareholding and bank lending, this
should have a positive e⁄ect on ￿rm value (see Barucci and Mattesini, 2008).
On the other hand, the combination of debt and equity may raise potential
con￿ icts of interest which may weaken the e⁄ectiveness of banks as monitors.
Debt holders are inherently risk averse because they face downside risk on
their loans. Shareholders are assumed to be less risk averse, especially when
they hold a diversi￿ed portfolio of stocks. Also when we compare banks and
other institutional investors in terms of monitoring potential, several e⁄ects
may be at work. When institutional investors such as fund managers hold
equity stakes in ￿rms, they can monitor ￿rm management through actions
ranging from the sale of shares, the active use of voting rights or meetings
with management. The more independent they are from the ￿rms the stronger
their in￿ uence can be. Banks can use their lending activity as an additional
instrument to discipline management. However, it is also argued that banks
may be locked in a lending relationship which may weaken their ability to
in￿ uence ￿rm management. Moreover, if a bank holding equity is primarily
interested in ensuring the service of its outstanding debt, this would con￿ ict
with shareholders￿interests (Brickley et al. (1988), Almazan et al. (1995)).
Hence, it remains an empirical matter to ascertain whether or not the in-
volvement of banks in corporate governance a⁄ects the long term pro￿tability
of non-￿nancial ￿rms. The evidence on the relationship between bank share-
holding and ￿rm performance is mixed. For Japanese ￿rms, Morck et al. (2000)
report a nonlinear relationship between Tobin￿ s q and bank shareholding. In
Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) ￿nd that ￿rm performance is positively
8a⁄ected by bank shareholding, but Chirinko and Elston (2006) report that
bank control a⁄ects company pro￿tability negatively, although signi￿cance is
weak. Blass et al. (1998) report that banks are signi￿cant blockholders in Is-
rael. They conclude, however, that the bene￿ts that the powerful role of banks
have for shareholders are outweighed by the costs, e.g., the lack of an external
control market. Barucci and Mattesini (2008) examine the motivations behind
banks￿shareholding of non ￿nancial ￿rms using a panel of large Italian com-
panies in the period 1994￿ 2000. They show that banks are shareholders of
companies that are less pro￿table, have experienced slower growth, are more
indebted, are endowed with collateral and have hard time to repay their debt
out of current income. Banks are more likely to hold shares in companies they
lend to. Overall the evidence suggests that there is complementarity between
bank equity holding and lending.
Since banks may face limitations in their pursuit of shareholder value max-
imization, many have looked to institutional investors as alternative potential
monitors. Moreover, since they collectively are the largest owners of equity,
they have a clear incentive to maximize shareholder value. Pound (1991) and
Black (1992b) discuss how institutional investors, as large shareholders, can
become monitors and increase ￿rm value. The argument that institutional
monitors can increase ￿rm value, however, implicitly assumes that they have
objectives similar to other shareholders. As recognized by Black (1992a) and
others, institutional monitors are also agents with their own source of agency
con￿ icts. In certain types of institutional investors, such as public pension
funds, this problem can be severe. However, Woidtke (2002) shows that ￿rm
value is positively related only to ownership by private pension funds. Gillan
and Starks (2003) state that the rise of professional money managers as a large
9shareholder group in companies can increase the potential for monitoring of
￿rm management. Institutions￿involvement can range from threatening the
sale of shares to the active use of corporate voting rights or meetings with
management. Moreover, foreign institutional investors are often believed to
play more of a role in prompting changes in corporate governance practices
than domestic money managers.
Cornett et al. (2004) conclude that the presence of institutions without
potential business relationships with the ￿rm is associated with better ￿rm
operating performance. Chen et al. (2007) examine independent institutional
investors that have maintained large stakes in a ￿rm for at least one year
(long-term) to specialize in monitoring activities, and show little short-term
trading pro￿t. Furthermore, monitoring institutions will bene￿t from their
monitoring e⁄orts, but at least some of this bene￿t will be shared with other
stockholders. They conclude that the net bene￿ts of monitoring increase with
the size of the stake, the length of time invested, and the independence of
the institution (absence of potential business ties) as monitoring is usually
considered to cost less for independent than for so-called grey institutions.
These institutions have a disadvantage in pressuring corporate managers for
changes because it may harm their business relationships with the ￿rm. Fer-
reira and Matos (2008) examine what drives institutional investors to ￿rms
and what role these investors play. Following Brickley et al. (1988), Almazan
et al. (2005), and Chen et al. (2007), they divide institutions into two groups:
independent institutions (mutual fund managers and investment advisers) and
grey institutions (banks, bank trusts, insurance companies, and other insti-
tutions). Independent institutions tend to be ￿pressure-resistant,￿while grey
institutions tend to be ￿pressure-sensitive￿or loyal to corporate management.
10For example, they ￿nd that banks and insurance companies are more sup-
portive of management actions than other types of institutional investors in
antitakeover amendment proposals. They ￿nd that both types of institutions
share a preference for large, widely held, and visible stocks consistent with
￿ndings in the U.S. market (Bennett et al. (2003)). The results also show that
independent managers invest more in ￿rms with liquid stock and ￿rms in coun-
tries with strong legal environments, compared to grey managers (especially
bank-controlled ones).
Hypothesis: Institutional investor ownership has a positive e⁄ect on ￿rm
value caused by stricter monitoring. Bank ownership has no signi￿cant e⁄ect
on ￿rm value.
The last question is how the capital structure of a ￿rm in￿ uences the im-
pact of shareholders on corporate performance. One of the avenues through
which discipline can be imposed on corporate managers is the use of debt.
The theoretical literature on ownership and capital structure predicts either
higher or lower levels of ￿nancial leverage depending on the manager￿ s risk
aversion, the costs of monitoring and bankruptcy, the threat of takeovers, and
the growth opportunities of the ￿rm. Theories of ownership and capital struc-
ture emphasize the role of debt in reducing agency problems between managers
and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Grossman
and Hart (1982) argue that managers prefer lower ￿nancial leverage because
it reduces the risk of bankruptcy and protects their underdiversi￿ed human
capital. Jensen (1986) argues that a larger level of debt pre-commits the man-
ager to working harder to generate and pay o⁄the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows to outside
investors and therefore reduces the overinvestment problem, particularly in
￿rms with excess free cash ￿ ow.
11Mahrt-Smith (2005) models the ownership structure and capital structure
jointly. The model shows that any empirical analysis should include both the
ownership structure and the capital structure features of ￿rms, because omit-
ting one or the other could lead to loss of explanatory power or even biased
results. Likewise, Dri¢ eld et al. (2007) argue that in attempting to deter-
mine the e⁄ect of ownership on both capital structure and ￿rm value, we are
faced with a simultaneity problem. McConnell and Servaes (1995), for exam-
ple, argue that ￿rm value and capital structure could be closely correlated,
which is further reiterated in Berger and di Patti (2006). On the one hand,
high leverage may reduce the agency costs of outside equity, and increase ￿rm
value by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders.
On the other hand, there can be reverse causation from ￿rm performance
to capital structure. For example, more e¢ cient ￿rms may choose lower eq-
uity ratios than others, all else equal, because higher e¢ ciency reduces the
expected costs of bankruptcy and ￿nancial distress. More e¢ cient ￿rms may
also choose higher equity capital ratios, all else equal, to protect the rents or
franchise value associated with high e¢ ciency from the possibility of liquida-
tion (Berger and di Patti, 2003). The estimated coe¢ cient of Q in the leverage
equation would capture the net value of these two possible e⁄ects that work
in opposite directions. If ￿rm valuation a⁄ects the choice of capital structure
and vice versa, then the failure to take this into account may result in a simul-
taneity bias, with important implications for the pattern of ￿rm ￿nancing and
valuation. According to Thomsen et al. (2006) ￿rm value may have positive
and negative feedback e⁄ects on blockholder ownership. Negative feedback￿
blockholder ownership drops following increases in ￿rm value￿ may occur if
blockholders are more inclined to sell shares in a ￿rm when its share price is
high (Zeckhouser and Pound (1990)). Positive feedback e⁄ects from ￿rm value
12on blockholder ownership may occur if blockholders have a strong preference
to remain in control (the control preference hypothesis), since a higher mar-
ket price makes it possible to ￿nance a given level of investment by issuing a
smaller amount of stock to outside owners (La Porta et al. (2000)).
Hypothesis: when ￿nancial institutions are large shareholders, ￿rms will
hold more debt as a disciplining device for managers.
3 Data
3.1 Ownership data
The ownership data is obtained from AMADEUS provided by Bureau Van
Dijk (BvD, Brussels). Several papers, such as Li et al. (2006), have used own-
ership data from BvD, primarily OSIRIS. The ownership data is identical in
AMADEUS and OSIRIS as both products only di⁄er in their scope. It is im-
portant to note that the starting point of this dataset is di⁄erent from datasets
such as Factset used in Ferreira and Matos (2008). BvD starts from the ￿rm
for which it collects balance sheet and ownership information. Factset collects
shareholdings from ￿nancial institutions.
As we exploit ownership structure changes over time, we use AMADEUS
DVDs for each year from 1999 to 2007. We retain shareholdings for the period
1997-2006 for listed non-￿nancial ￿rms in the EU15 for which detailed own-
ership data are available. We exclude ￿nancial ￿rms from the sample because
institutional investments in these ￿rms may be motivated by di⁄erent consid-
erations. As BvD provides no historic ownership information, we obtain for
13each year a cross-section of the ￿rms￿ownership structure . BvD provides the
date when a shareholder enters the ownership structure of a company. which
enables us to reconstruct the shareholder structure. Before 1999, we take the
conservative approach and use data from the most recent date.
Amadeus subdivides the shareholders in di⁄erent types: Bank; Employ-
ees/Managers; Financial company; Foundation/Research Institute; Individ-
ual(s) or family(ies); Industrial company; Insurance company; Mutual & Pen-
sion fund/Trust/Nominee; Other unnamed shareholders; Private Equity ￿rms;
Private individuals/private shareholder; Self-owned; State/Public authority;
Unknown; Unnamed private shareholders. Since we focus on ￿nancial institu-
tions and banks in particular, we control the accuracy of these entries. First,
we control whether inconsistencies arise in shareholder type over the years. We
use the most recent shareholder type since this proves to be the most accu-
rate. Second, we control the names of the shareholders for keywords (in English
or languages of the sample countries) that indicate whether a shareholder is
a ￿nancial institution (e.g., ￿bank,￿￿insurance company,￿etc.). Finally, we
use a list of ￿nancial institutions provided by Li et al. (2006) to cross-check
the ￿nancial institution shareholders in our sample. They use company in-
formation databases (Lexis/Nexis and Dun and Bradstreet), business news
stories (through Factiva, Proquest, and the Google internet search engine),
the shareholders￿web sites and LionShares database constructed by Factset
Research Systems, Inc., which collects shareholdings of more than 4,000 large
investment managers domiciled around the world.
The ￿nal ownership dataset has 159389 observations which belong to 35349
di⁄erent shareholders. Appendix B shows the distribution of the shareholder
types. As percentage of total shareholdings AMADEUS provides alternatively
14the direct or total shareholding. When available we use total shareholding,
otherwise direct shareholding.
Total ￿nancial institutional ownership (FI) is de￿ned as the sum of the per-
centage holdings of all ￿nancial institutions in a ￿rm￿ s stock for each year.
Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), we
set ￿nancial institution ownership variables to zero if a stock is not held by
any ￿nancial institution. Hence, these ￿rms remain in the sample. Chen et
al. (2007) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) classify institutions according to
the potential for business ties with a corporation and distinguish independent
(money managers) and grey institutions (banks and insurance companies).
We focus on banks as shareholders and compare their in￿ uence with that of
non-bank institutional investors, such as insurance companies, mutual funds,
pension funds and private equity funds. As a result, bank ownership (BANK)
is the percentage of shares held by banks and investment vehicles under their
direct control. Institutional investors (INST INV) is the percentage of shares
held by ￿nancial companies, insurance companies, mutual & pension funds,
trusts and private equity ￿rms which are not part of a bank. Following Ferreira
and Matos (2008) we also consider the geographic origin of the ￿nancial insti-
tution. FI/BANK/INST INV domestic is the sum of the percentage holdings
of all ￿nancial institutions domiciled in the same country in which the stock
is issued. FI/BANK/INST INV foreign is the sum of the percentage holdings
of all institutions domiciled in a country di⁄erent from the country in which
the stock is issued.
153.2 Balance sheet data
The sample of non-￿nancial listed European ￿rms is constructed from AMADEUS,
a pan-European ￿nancial database that provides detailed balance sheet and
income statement data for companies in Europe and standardized balance
sheet information with the stated objective of achieving uniformity and en-
abling cross-border analysis. We select all consolidated listed ￿rms of the EU15
for the period 1996-2006 . This sample of ￿rms is merged with market data
from Datastream, we use the ISIN code of the ￿rm as identi￿er. To reduce
the impact of outliers we winsorize the sample at the 1st and 99th percentile.
We delete all observations for which one of the variables is missing. Appen-
dix A presents an overview of the ￿rm-speci￿c variables used in our empirical
analysis. The construction of the variables is standard in the literature (see,
e.g., Flannery and Rangan (2006) for the determinants of corporate leverage
and Ferreira and Matos (2008) for the determinants of ￿nancial institution
ownership).
3.3 Country variables.
In the regressions we include country-speci￿c variables to account for any
di⁄erences across countries. However, since we focus on the 15 countries of
the ￿ old￿European Union, we do not expect that country di⁄erences should
explain a lot of the cross-sectional variation across ￿rms. The EU has im-
plemented a broad range of legal provisions aimed at harmonising the insti-
tutional and business conditions across the EU. We include the quality of a
country￿ s legal environment (LEGAL) and an index on strength of auditing
16and reporting standards (AUDIT) from the Global competitiveness report to
assess the transparancy of business life in the respective countries.
We include two indicators of ￿nancial market development obtained from
the Financial Development and Structure database of the World Bank. We use
private bond market capitalization to GDP, calculated as the ratio of private
domestic debt securities as a share of GDP, as a proxy for the development of
the bond market, and a measure of stock market development, i.e. the value
of listed shares to GDP to proxy for the development of stock markets.
The ￿nal dataset contains 2851 listed non-￿nancial ￿rms from EU15 for the
period 1997-2006, leading to 13046 ￿rm-year observations. See Table 1 for the
summary statistics of the variables.
4 Empirical strategy
We argue that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial institution ownership on corporate per-
formance should be analysed in a broad but coherent framework. Hence, we
need to explore the interactions between ownership, ￿rm capital structure and
performance. The empirical analysis proceeds in steps. First, we investigate
the determinants of ￿nancial institution ownership. In the next step we exam-
ine the relationship between corporate performance, measured as Tobin￿ s Q,
and ￿nancial institution shareholdings. This analysis is gradually augmented,
starting with a single-equation speci￿cation for Q and ending with a three-
equation model in which all interactions are estimated simultaneously. All
variable de￿nitions can be found in Appendix A.
174.1 Determinants
We start with the determinants of corporate ownership by the di⁄erent types
of ￿nancial institutions:
Ownijt = ￿0+￿1LnTAijt+￿2MBijt+￿3TURNOV ERijt+￿4DYijt+￿5ROEijt
+ ￿6SDijt + ￿7BDRijt + ￿8CASHijt + ￿9CLOSEijt + ￿10AUDITjt
+ ￿11LEGALjt + ￿12BONDjt + ￿13STOCKjt + yeardummies + ￿ijt (1)
We proceed by estimating the e⁄ect of ownership by banks and institutional




The second model is a system of equations linking the determinants of ￿rm
value and ownership (similar to Ferreira and Matos (2008):
Qijt = ￿q;0+￿q;1Ownijt+￿q;2LnTAijt+￿q;3BDRijt+￿q;4CASHijt+￿q;5Q_medijt
+￿q;6AUDITijt+￿q;7LEGALijt+￿q;8BONDjt+￿q;9STOCKjt+yeardummies+￿q;ijt




The third model is a system of three equations capturing the determinants of
￿rm value, ownership and leverage. Identi￿cation in the leverage equation is
obtained by using ￿xed assets of the company, depreciation, pro￿tability and
18the median industry capital structure (see Baert and Vander Vennet (2008)
and Flannery and Rangan (2006)):
Qijt = ￿q;0+￿q;1Ownijt+￿q;2LnTAijt+￿q;3BDRijt+￿q;4CASHijt+￿q;5Q_medijt
+￿q;6AUDITijt+￿q;7LEGALijt+￿q;8BONDjt+￿q;9STOCKjt+yeardummies+￿q;ijt





+ ￿lev;11STOCKjt + yeardummies + ￿lev;ijt (4)
Consequently, in our empirical setup we explore three relationships simulta-
neously. The ￿rst is the link between the ownership structure of ￿rms and their
performance, measured as the Tobin￿ s Q. Q = f(bankownership;BDR;X).
The second is the relationship between bank ownership and ￿rm speci￿c de-
terminants. bankownership = f(BDR;Q;Y ) The third association is that
between the observed leverage of a ￿rm and its ownership structure, with
a special focus on banks, since they can hold both debt and equity, BDR
= f(bankownership;Q;Z). X, Y and Z contain the respective control vari-
ables.
195 Results
5.1 What determines ￿nancial institution ownership?
We start with the determinants of ￿nancial institutions ownership in non-
￿nancial ￿rms. The estimated model is similar to the one in Ferreira and Matos
(2008). This should allow comparison of the ￿ndings, although the country
coverage is broader in their sample while we focus on the European Union.
We examine the ownership preferences of banks versus non-bank institutional
investors as well as the di⁄erences between domestic and foreign institutions.
5.1.1 Banks versus institutional investors
We start by examining which ￿rm- and country-level characteristics a⁄ect ￿-
nancial institution ownership, subdivided in banks and non-bank institutional
investors. Table 2 presents the estimates of the ownership panel regressions,
the ￿rst two columns contain the results for all ￿nancial institutions, the next
two for banks and the last two for institutional investors. For each type of
owner, we estimate two speci￿cations: OLS with ￿rm- and country-level vari-
ables and OLS with ￿rm-level variables and country ￿xed e⁄ects. We use panel
corrected standard errors allowing for heterogeneity at the ￿rm level (Rogers
standard errors) together with year dummies (dummy for 2006 is excluded)
to control for residual correlation across years and residual correlation across
￿rms in a given year. When country dummies are included we exclude the
dummy for the U.K. The results show that ￿nancial institutions share two
common preferences in their choice to become shareholders: ￿rm size and the
closeness of the ownership structure. The main common driver of ￿nancial
20institution ownership is the size of the ￿rm, the estimated coe¢ cient is always
positive and signi￿cant. The ￿nding that ￿nancial institutions prefer equity
holdings in large European ￿rms is consistent with similar ￿ndings for di⁄er-
ent samples, e.g., Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) for the
U.S. market, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) for the Swedish market and
Ferreira and Matos (2008) for a broad international sample. The rationale is
that ￿nancial institutions have concerns about liquidity and transaction costs.
Investing in the equity of large corporations alleviates these concerns. Second,
all ￿nancial institutions avoid holding equity in closely held ￿rms, the coe¢ -
cient on CLOSE is always negative and signi￿cant. Investors may shy away
from ￿rms that are closely held, fearing the power of insiders to expropriate
￿rm resources at the expense of minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999),
Leuz et al. (2006) and Ammer et al. (2006) also ￿nd that outside investors
avoid ownership in closely held companies.
Firm ownership of all ￿nancial institutions is positively a⁄ected by the div-
idend yield of the corporations. However, this e⁄ect is largely driven by the
institutional investors. This ￿nding is expected since fund managers have a
￿duciary obligation to their investors and hence prefer stocks paying regular
dividends. As in Ferreira an Matos (2008), we ￿nd that ￿nancial institutions
do not avoid stock market volatility, measured here as the standard devia-
tion of stock returns. While this is contrary to the predictions of the ￿prudent
man￿rules (Del Guercio (1996)), which Gompers and Metrick (2001) also ￿nd
for money managers in the U.S., it is consistent with the interpretation that
institutional investors seek dividend yield in the ￿rst place and are able to
alleviate idiosyncratic ￿rm risk by diversifying their equity holdings. Banks,
on the other hand, avoid high idiosyncratic volatility stocks, because they hold
21less diversi￿ed equity portfolios. Finally, banks prefer stocks in ￿rms with a
relatively high level of leverage (BDR), the coe¢ cient is positive and signif-
icant. This may be an indication of the complementarity of debt and equity
for banks as owners. The country-level variables reveal that all ￿nancial in-
stitutions prefer stocks from companies located in countries with sound legal
regimes and especially the non-bank institutional investors prefer countries
with large bond and stock markets. This suggests that institutional investors
have a preference for liquid markets. In that respect, the negative sign of the
stock market turnover ratio is somewhat counterintuitive.
5.1.2 Domestic versus foreign ￿nancial institutions as ￿rm owners
We also examine whether the country of origin of the di⁄erent types of ￿-
nancial institutions a⁄ects the results. Table 3 presents estimates of the deter-
minants of ￿nancial institution ownership by institution type and whether or
not they are from the same country as the ￿rms in which they hold equity (do-
mestic/foreign). All institutions have a strong preference for large ￿rms except
domestic non-banks, which may re￿ ect some degree of home bias in the stock-
holdings of domestic institutional investors. Apart from the ￿rm size variable,
no consistent patterns emerge. Closely held ￿rms are not favored by foreign
banks and domestic non-banks. Dividend yield only a⁄ects the ownership of
domestic ￿nancial institutions while it remains insigni￿cant for foreign insti-
tutions, perhaps because of tax concerns (Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001);
Ammer et al. (2005)). On the other hand, foreign ￿nancial institutions of both
types seem to prefer investments in liquid stocks (TURNOVER) and less risk
stocks (standard deviation of returns (SD)). The positive association between
leverage and bank ownership is only found for domestic banks. The quality of
22a country￿ s legal environment (LEGAL) is positively related to the presence
of all ￿nancial institutions, consistent with the law and ￿nance literature (La
Porta et al. (1998)).
5.2 E⁄ect of ￿nancial institution ownership on corporate performance
5.2.1 Single equation
To investigate the relation between institutional ownership and ￿rm value,
we adopt Tobin￿ s Q as a measure of ￿rm value, calculated as the book value
of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity
divided by total assets (Gompers et al. (2003); Doidge et al. (2004)). Since
Tobin￿ s Q contains the stock market value of the ￿rms￿equity, it is a forward-
looking measure of ￿rm performance. It captures the long-term pro￿t potential
of each ￿rm as assessed by the stock market. In this respect, it is a more
complete indicator of company performance than accounting pro￿ts, which are
inherently backward looking. Using a market value indicator, i.e. the value of
the discounted future cash ￿ ows generated by the investment in a ￿rm￿ s stock,
also alleviates the endogeneity issue.
Following Ferreira and Matos (2008) we estimate regressions of a ￿rm￿ s To-
bin￿ s Q on variables associated with ￿rm value such as size (LnTA), leverage
(BDR), cash holdings (CASH), and median Tobin￿ s Q for the ￿rm￿ s industry.
We also include country-level variables that are usually considered in the liter-
ature. Most important, we include the ￿nancial institution ownership variables
that are our focus, namely total ￿nancial institutions, banks and non-bank in-
stitutional investors. The ￿ndings are reported in table 4, the ￿rst regression
23includes year dummies and country-level variables, the second regression in-
cludes both year and country dummies. The main result of table 4 is that,
irrespective of the type of ￿nancial institution, there is no signi￿cant rela-
tionship of ￿nancial institution ownership with ￿rm value. All coe¢ cients on
￿nancial institutions and the subgroups banks and institutional investors are
insigni￿cant. This ￿nding is in line with the result that Ferreira and Matos
(2008) report for what they label grey institutions, which include banks. How-
ever, they report a positive e⁄ect of independent ￿nancial investor ownership,
which include mutual and pension funds, on ￿rm value. One potential expla-
nation is that our sample coverage di⁄ers from theirs, we focus on European
￿rms, their country coverage is broader. Table 5 shows that our results remain
unaltered when we use log(Q) or -1/Q instead of Q. This is also the case when
we replace Tobin￿ s Q with return on assets (ROA) as an accounting measure
of corporate pro￿tability (Table 6).
The behavior of the control variables is generally consistent with expecta-
tions and with the ￿ndings reported in Ferreira and Matos (2008). Large and
cash-rich ￿rms have higher valuations. The individual ￿rm￿ s Tobin￿ s Q is pos-
itively a⁄ected by the median Q in its industry. And higher leverage (BDR)
has a negative e⁄ect on Tobin￿ s Q. Hence, after accounting for the e⁄ect of a
set of standard control variables, we ￿nd that there is no e⁄ect from ￿nancial
institution ownership both on the long-run performance potential and on a
short-term pro￿t measure of the European listed ￿rms in our sample.
245.2.2 Simultaneous equations
A potential explanation for these non-results is the possible endogeneity
of ￿nancial institution shareholdings and the capital structure of ￿rms. As
we explain in the hypothesis section, ￿nancial institutions ownership may be
driven by a speci￿c set of determinants (see Table 2). Similarly, the capital
structure decisions of ￿rms may be determined by a speci￿c set of ￿rm-speci￿c
variables. Hence, our preferred speci￿cation is a system of simultaneous equa-
tions which captures the drivers of the leverage and the ownership decision
and which employs these interactions to determine the ultimate e⁄ect on the
long-term pro￿t potential of listed ￿rms. We proceed in two steps. The ￿rst
setup considers two equations using three-stage least squares estimation, one
for the ownership decision of ￿nancial institutions and the second for the de-
terminants of Tobin￿ s Q. This is similar to the approach used in Ferreira and
Matos (2008).
The results are in table 7. The e⁄ect of ￿nancial institution ownership on
Tobin￿ s Q is negative and signi￿cant and this holds for both banks and non-
bank institutional investors. This evidence is inconsistent with any form of
the monitoring hypothesis. It is noteworthy that the negative association with
long-term corporate performance holds both for banks and non-bank insti-
tutional investors. Apparently, neither of these shareholder types can exert
su¢ cient in￿ uence to have an impact on ￿rm performance.
The coe¢ cients in the ownership equation indicate that ￿nancial institution
ownership is positively a⁄ected by ￿rm size, indicating that these owners have
a preference for large companies, and by dividend yield, indicating a preference
for ￿rms paying the largest dividends. Moreover, the variable capturing the
25riskiness of the stock, SD or the standard deviation of stock market returns,
is negative and signi￿cant. Combined these ￿ndings suggest that both banks
and institutional investors act as ￿ normal￿stock market investors, seeking cash
returns and avoiding risk. Institutional investors display a higher coe¢ cient
on dividend yield, in accordance with their objective as ￿duciary investors.
The negative coe¢ cient on CLOSE is also in line with previous ￿ndings (see
Ferreira and Matos (2008)), as well as the country-speci￿c indicators of legal
quality and bond and stock market development. When we consider the coef-
￿cients of the Tobin￿ s Q equation, the results are broadly similar to the ones
in table 4. Median industry Q, cash holdings and the size of the ￿rm display
a positive association with its market value. The book leverage variable has
a negative impact on Q, as in Ferreira and Matos (2008). Given the expected
behavior of the control variables, the ￿nding that ￿nancial institutions add no
(market) value as shareholders can only be interpreted as a lack of monitoring
in￿ uence on corporate management.
The results remain qualitatively unaltered when we replace Q with log(Q)
as the dependent variable (Table 8). This is also the case when we treat ROA
as the dependent variable (Table 9). Hence, the negative contribution to ￿rm
performance of banks and institutional investors as shareholders even holds for
a short-term pro￿t measure. This reinforces the interpretation that not only
institutional investors but also banks lack the capacity to in￿ uence corporate
management in terms of pro￿t generation.
A two-equation system enriches the analysis. But we argue that a more com-
plete setup should also include an explicit modeling of the capital structure
decision. Banks can hold both debt and equity and can potentially use both
￿nancing means to in￿ uence corporate management. Institutional investors
26only hold equity and can only exert in￿ uence as shareholders. Therefore, in
the ￿nal empirical step, we augment our system of simultaneous equations
with a leverage equation. In Table 10 we report the results of three-stage least
squares (3SLS) regressions of a system of simultaneous equations for Tobin￿ s
Q, ￿nancial institution ownership and leverage. The interpretation is as fol-
lows: after controlling for the ￿rm￿ s leverage decision, the ownership decision
by ￿nancial institutions and a series of commonly used ￿rm- and country-
speci￿c determinants of Tobin￿ s Q, we ￿nd that ￿nancial institution ownership
is negatively associated with the long-term pro￿t potential of European listed
￿rms. This negative market value e⁄ect holds both for banks and institutional
investors. The results for the three-equation system corroborate those of the
two-equation setup. Apparently, ￿nancial institutions treat their sharehold-
ings in non-￿nancial ￿rms as pure investments, rather than as an instrument
to in￿ uence corporate management. Again, the results are robust for alter-
native indicators of ￿rm performance as the dependent variable, i.e. log(Q)
(Table 11) and also ROA (Table 12). In table 13 we perform an additional
robustness check to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem by including
the one-period lagged values of the explanatory variables. All results remain
unaltered. In fact, the ￿nding that ￿nancial institutions prefer shareholdings
in large, cash-rich, high dividend yield and widely held ￿rms is even strength-
ened. Furthermore, when we split the sample into quartiles according to the
size of the ￿rms or restrict the sample to companies with positive pro￿tability
or rerun the regression for Germany and the U.K. sereperately as these coun-
tries represent the extremes in ownership culture in Europe or take only ￿rms
with positive ￿nancial institution ownership the results remain unaltered.
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We investigate the relationship between ￿nancial institution ownership, cor-
porate leverage and the market value of a of 2851 listed non-￿nancial ￿rms
from EU15 for the period 1997-2006. More speci￿cally, we focus on the value
added of banks versus institutional investors in their role as shareholders on
non-￿nancial ￿rms. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, we report that ￿nancial institutions, both bank and non-banks, typ-
ically hold equity stakes in large, cash rich and widely held ￿rms which are
moreover characterized by high dividend yield and a lower than average in-
vestment risk, measured as the volatility of the weekly stock market returns.
The preference for dividends and low-risk stocks is most pronounced for in-
stitutional investors. We interpret these ￿ndings as evidence that ￿nancial
institutions behave like typical investors, seeking return rather than in￿ uence.
Second, after controlling for the captial structure decision of the ￿rms and
the ownership decision of ￿nancial institutions in a simultaneous equations
model, we ￿nd that there is a negative relationship between ￿nancial insti-
tution ownership and the market value of ￿rms, measured as the Tobin￿ s Q.
This negative value e⁄ect holds for banks as well as institutional investors.
This is in sharp contradiction with the monitoring hypothesis. We ￿nd no
evidence that banks, which can use both debt and equity as potential moni-
toring insturments, as well as institutional shareholders are e⁄ective monitors
of corporate management. This questions their rol as shareholders.
Third, although the presence of ￿nancial institutions in the ownership struc-
ture of ￿rms is associated with higher levels of leverage, this feature does not
28function as an e⁄ective disciplining device for managers. Instead we ￿nd a
negative association between leverage and the market value of ￿rms.
Over the sample period, banks have reduced their equity holdings in non-
￿nancial ￿rms. Given our results, this seems to be socially optimal. Tax mea-
sures to allow banks to dispose of their equity stakes, such as the one enacted
in Germany point in the direction that banks themselves are aware of the fact
that their in￿ uence on corporate management is limited. Now that the ￿nan-
cial crisis forces banks and regulators to review the scope of banking franchises
it might be advisable to restrict banks to hold equity of non-￿nancial ￿rms.
Banks should focus on intermediation and not combine lending and equity
stakes, because this creates con￿ icts of interest.
Institutional investors have become more important as shareholders. Yet
our results indicate that their value added in terms of creating shareholder
value is limited. This may have di⁄erent reasons. One plausible explanation
could be that most institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension
funds, have ￿duciary duties to their own investors and typically track large
stocks in widely used stock market indices. This would imply that they merely
act as investors and do not seek to monitor or in￿ uence corporate managers.
In order to provoke a more active stance as shareholder it would be advisable
to encourage this class of owners to use their voting rights more actively.
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34Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FI 13046 0.288 0.278 0 1
BANK 13046 0.055 0.104 0 1
INST INV 13046 0.235 0.247 0 1
FI domestic 13046 0.225 0.251 0 1
BANK domestic 13046 0.041 0.092 0 1
INST INV domestic 13046 0.184 0.222 0 1
FI foreign 13046 0.065 0.121 0 1
BANK foreign 13046 0.014 0.045 0 0.996
INST INV foreign 13046 0.052 0.104 0 1
CLOSE 13046 0.408 0.261 0.0003 0.980
ROA 12996 3.704 12.447 -77.23 31.68
ROE 13046 0.034 0.441 -3.249 0.856
DY 13046 0.028 0.027 0 0.1493
SD 13046 0.535 1.530 0 8.689
AUDIT 13046 5.888 0.378 4.4 6.2
LEGAL 13046 31.211 13.225 0 42.85
TURNOVER 13046 0.545 0.595 0 3.538
CASH 13046 0.105 0.126 0 0.820
BDR 13046 0.206 0.170 0 0.798
BDR_med 13046 0.181 0.077 0.046 0.378
LnTA 13046 19.283 1.931 14.037 24.126
EBIT_TA 13046 0.050 0.139 -0.949 0.339
MB 13046 1.251 1.133 0.155 8.5619
DEP_TA 13046 0.047 0.039 0 0.283
FA_TA 13046 0.302 0.245 0 0.997
Q 13046 1.933 1.178 0.366 9.669
Q_med 13046 1.647 0.306 1.219 2.860
This table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations (Obs) of variables. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006.
Table 1
Summary stats-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
LnTA 0.015 0.013 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.01
[5.69]** [4.76]** [5.22]** [3.60]** [4.14]** [3.97]**
MB -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0
[0.30] [0.15] [0.46] [1.14] [0.28] [0.16]
TURNOVER -0.013 -0.009 0.005 0.005 -0.019 -0.014
[2.33]* [1.57] [2.12]* [2.19]* [3.74]** [2.85]**
DY 0.565 0.66 0.093 0.124 0.514 0.581
[4.15]** [4.81]** [1.68] [2.24]* [4.12]** [4.63]**
ROE -0.017 -0.015 -0.002 -0.003 -0.016 -0.013
[2.79]** [2.41]* [0.88] [1.34] [2.81]** [2.21]*
SD -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
[1.89] [2.37]* [5.42]** [4.32]** [0.53] [1.49]
BDR 0.025 0.026 0.03 0.023 -0.004 0.006
[1.06] [1.11] [3.28]** [2.43]* [0.17] [0.26]
CASH -0.06 -0.063 -0.018 -0.018 -0.042 -0.046
[2.02]* [2.11]* [1.93] [1.92] [1.51] [1.65]
CLOSE -0.078 -0.071 -0.014 -0.018 -0.063 -0.052
[4.29]** [4.00]** [1.83] [2.48]* [3.82]** [3.27]**
AUDIT -0.056 -0.016 -0.04
[5.17]** [2.81]** [4.21]**
LEGAL 0.004 0.001 0.004
[7.75]** [2.72]** [7.45]**
BOND MARKET 0.142 0.22 0.009 0.047 0.132 0.173
[6.59]** [4.91]** [0.97] [2.14]* [6.35]** [4.73]**
STOCK MARKET 0.152 0.179 0.002 0.048 0.151 0.134
[9.18]** [9.13]** [0.26] [5.57]** [10.45]** [8.07]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
country dummies no yes no yes no yes
Constant 0.134 -0.024 0.051 -0.052 0.083 0.027
[1.72] [0.41] [1.40] [2.35]* [1.21] [0.51]
Observations 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.22
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2
Determinants of financial institutions
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of ownership for all
financial institutions (FI), banks (BANK) and institutional investors (INST INV). All regressions inlcude the firm-level regressors
log of total assets (LnTA), log book-to-market (BM) , turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE),
standard deviation of weekly returns (SD), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH) and closely held shares (CLOSE). All
regressions include the country-level regressors market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and
market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Regression 1, 3 and 5 also include the country-level
regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT) and legal regime index (LEGAL) whereas regression 2, 4 and 6 include
country dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. The robust t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.
FI BANK INST INV-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
FI BANK INST INV FI BANK INST INV
LnTA 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.007
[2.49]* [3.93]** [1.07] [8.21]** [4.66]** [7.56]**
MB -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0
[0.69] [1.22] [0.41] [0.83] [1.60] [0.27]
TURNOVER -0.039 -0.004 -0.036 0.027 0.009 0.018
[8.03]** [1.89] [8.41]** [8.50]** [6.61]** [6.83]**
DY 0.59 0.101 0.52 -0.005 -0.008 0.004
[4.59]** [2.02]* [4.46]** [0.10] [0.37] [0.08]
ROE -0.014 -0.003 -0.012 -0.004 0.001 -0.005
[2.50]* [1.42] [2.28]* [1.59] [0.83] [2.09]*
SD -0.003 -0.002 0 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
[1.12] [3.67]** [0.18] [2.16]* [4.31]** [0.82]
BDR 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.005
[1.11] [2.83]** [0.05] [0.19] [1.76] [0.53]
CASH -0.076 -0.02 -0.056 0.014 0.001 0.013
[2.87]** [2.37]* [2.25]* [1.12] [0.32] [1.13]
CLOSE -0.069 -0.009 -0.059 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003
[4.00]** [1.27] [3.77]** [1.05] [2.08]* [0.40]
AUDIT -0.044 -0.014 -0.031 -0.011 -0.002 -0.009
[4.47]** [2.52]* [3.65]** [2.10]* [1.60] [1.76]
LEGAL 0.003 0 0.003 0.001 0 0.001
[6.42]** [1.48] [6.53]** [4.57]** [3.93]** [3.56]**
BOND 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.011 -0.001 0.012
[6.21]** [1.18] [5.98]** [1.24] [0.31] [1.58]
STOCK 0.145 0.008 0.137 0.008 -0.006 0.014
[9.39]** [1.09] [10.35]** [1.18] [2.34]* [2.23]*
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
country dummies no no no no no no
Constant 0.149 0.034 0.114 -0.015 0.017 -0.033
[2.10]* [1.01] [1.84] [0.41] [1.52] [0.93]
Observations 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046
R-squared 0.21 0.07 0.2 0.16 0.1 0.11
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
domestic foreign
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of ownership for all
financial institutions (FI), banks (BANK) and institutional investors (INST INV). All regressions inlcude the firm-level regressors
log of total assets (LnTA), log book-to-market (BM) , turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE),
standard deviation of weekly returns (SD), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH) and closely held shares (CLOSE). All
regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market
capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP
(STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. The robust t-statistics
in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.
Table 3




BANK -0.013 -0.126 0.005 -0.118
[0.10] [0.97] [0.04] [0.91]
INST INV -0.065 -0.033 -0.065 -0.026
[0.98] [0.50] [0.97] [0.39]
LnTA 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009
[0.54] [0.95] [0.48] [0.96] [0.54] [0.93] [0.53] [0.97]
BDR -1.077 -1.098 -1.078 -1.096 -1.079 -1.099 -1.079 -1.096
[12.68]** [12.76]** [12.69]** [12.76]** [12.71]** [12.77]** [12.72]** [12.77]**
CASH 1.941 2.029 1.944 2.03 1.941 2.03 1.941 2.029
[9.92]** [10.37]** [9.93]** [10.37]** [9.91]** [10.36]** [9.92]** [10.37]**
Q_med 1.088 1.085 1.09 1.085 1.088 1.085 1.088 1.084
[14.06]** [14.19]** [14.12]** [14.23]** [14.07]** [14.21]** [14.07]** [14.20]**
AUDIT -0.05 -0.048 -0.05 -0.05
[1.22] [1.17] [1.22] [1.22]
LEGAL -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.84] [0.93] [0.81] [0.81]
BOND MARKET 0.01 0.557 0.004 0.554 0.013 0.555 0.013 0.559
[0.11] [2.73]** [0.04] [2.70]** [0.13] [2.72]** [0.13] [2.73]**
STOCK MARKET 0.245 0.254 0.238 0.253 0.248 0.252 0.248 0.256
[3.71]** [3.17]** [3.62]** [3.19]** [3.73]** [3.14]** [3.73]** [3.20]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
Constant 0.102 -0.48 0.097 -0.486 0.1 -0.479 0.1 -0.484
[0.31] [1.81] [0.30] [1.83] [0.31] [1.80] [0.31] [1.82]
Observations 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Tobin’s Q. Ownership include
all financial institutions (FI), banks (BANK) and institutional investors (INST INV). Firm-level control variables include log total assets
(LnTA), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH) and European industry Tobin’s Q median (Q_med). All regressions include the country-
level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market
to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable
definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level.
Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.
Institutional ownership and firm value
Table 4-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
FI -0.028 -0.035 -0.023
[2.02]* [1.51] [1.10]
BANK -0.037 -0.021 0.007
[1.16] [0.41] [0.13]
INST INV -0.031 -0.044 -0.035
[1.91] [1.68] [1.59]
LnTA 0.02 0.019 0.02 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.027 0.027 0.027
[7.68]** [7.57]** [7.64]** [3.61]** [3.51]** [3.61]** [8.85]** [9.06]** [9.06]**
BDR -0.324 -0.324 -0.325 -0.53 -0.53 -0.531 -0.752 -0.752 -0.752
[15.04]** [15.03]** [15.08]** [14.75]** [14.76]** [14.79]** [21.73]** [22.22]** [22.42]**
CASH 0.285 0.286 0.285 0.711 0.713 0.71 1.183 1.192 1.184
[7.75]** [7.79]** [7.76]** [10.59]** [10.62]** [10.59]** [26.46]** [27.32]** [27.34]**
industry Q 0.662 0.663 0.663 0.781 0.783 0.782 0.853 0.847 0.846
[11.73]** [11.80]** [11.76]** [17.38]** [17.48]** [17.39]** [27.19]** [27.67]** [27.90]**
AUDIT -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.025 -0.024 -0.025
[1.31] [1.24] [1.28] [1.40] [1.32] [1.39]
LEGAL 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.75] [0.55] [0.73] [0.14] [0.02] [0.16]
BOND MARKET 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.332 0.313 0.334
[0.66] [0.50] [0.66] [0.26] [0.15] [0.28] [3.87]** [3.74]** [4.01]**
STOCK MARKET 0.06 0.055 0.06 0.11 0.105 0.112 0.038 0.03 0.04
[3.93]** [3.71]** [3.93]** [4.18]** [4.02]** [4.22]** [0.99] [0.80] [1.08]
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country dummies no no no no no no yes yes yes
industry dummies no no no no no no yes yes yes
Constant -0.501 -0.5 -0.501 -0.034 -0.036 -0.035 -0.785 -0.335 -0.763
[5.69]** [5.67]** [5.69]** [0.27] [0.28] [0.28] [3.69]** [1.62] [3.39]**
Observations 13046 13046 13046 13025 13025 13025 12684 12684 12684
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.41 0.41 0.41
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5
Institutional ownership and firm value
Robustness
logQ median Q -1/Q
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of respectively -1/Q, logQ and medianQ .
Ownership includes all financial institutions (FI), banks (BANK) and institutional investors (INST INV). Firm-level control variables include log total
assets (LnTA), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH) and European industry Tobin’s Q median (Q_med). All regressions include the country-level
regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND
MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period
is from 1997 to 2006. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in
boldface.-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6





INST INV -1.037 -0.612
[1.53] [0.90]
LnTA 1.568 1.576 1.566 1.577 1.562 1.571
[15.19]** [15.10]** [15.16]** [15.15]** [15.20]** [15.10]**
BDR -10.367 -10.733 -10.316 -10.686 -10.396 -10.748
[9.88]** [10.15]** [9.81]** [10.10]** [9.91]** [10.17]**
CASH -4.913 -4.767 -4.875 -4.757 -4.897 -4.745
[2.15]* [2.05]* [2.14]* [2.05]* [2.14]* [2.04]*
Q_med -1.248 -1.184 -1.237 -1.189 -1.23 -1.167
[2.32]* [2.22]* [2.30]* [2.23]* [2.29]* [2.19]*
AUDIT 0.508 0.524 0.528
[1.44] [1.48] [1.49]
LEGAL -0.072 -0.075 -0.073
[3.77]** [4.05]** [3.82]**
BOND MARKET 0.223 -2.469 0.093 -2.528 0.203 -2.54
[0.25] [1.57] [0.11] [1.60] [0.23] [1.62]
STOCK MARKET 1.982 2.519 1.818 2.507 1.968 2.455
[3.65]** [3.64]** [3.37]** [3.64]** [3.62]** [3.56]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
country dummies no yes no yes no yes
Constant -23.272 -24.146 -23.247 -24.283 -23.344 -24.125
[8.78]** [10.34]** [8.77]** [10.40]** [8.81]** [10.32]**
Observations 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of return on assets
(ROA). Ownership includes all financial institutions (FI), banks (BANK) and institutional investors (INST INV). Firm-level control
variables include log total assets (LnTA), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH) and European industry Tobin’s Q median
(Q_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index
(LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock
market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. The
robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in
boldface.
Table 6
Institutional ownership and firm value







Q -0.028 -0.009 -0.016
[3.18]** [2.64]** [2.01]*
LnTA 0.107 0.019 0.042 0.007 0.088 0.013
[7.19]** [14.90]** [4.19]** [13.41]** [6.29]** [11.48]**
TURNOVER -0.019 -0.005 -0.018
[7.15]** [2.91]** [6.38]**
DY 0.696 0.344 0.602
[8.32]** [9.14]** [7.73]**
ROE -0.044 -0.022 -0.038
[9.23]** [9.59]** [8.81]**
SD -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
[6.13]** [8.15]** [6.00]**
BDR -0.962 -0.021 -0.89 0.013 -1.16 -0.033
[8.56]** [1.18] [10.95]** [1.89] [9.31]** [2.14]*
CASH 1.517 0.005 1.858 0.01 1.494 -0.008
[9.70]** [0.21] [19.36]** [0.98] [8.62]** [0.33]
CLOSE -0.018 -0.01 -0.012
[2.16]* [2.96]** [1.83]
Q_med 0.787 0.983 0.826
[10.92]** [21.20]** [10.77]**
AUDIT -0.388 -0.058 -0.154 -0.018 -0.349 -0.041
[5.93]** [8.50]** [3.80]** [6.58]** [5.13]** [6.75]**
LEGAL 0.03 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.034 0.004
[6.85]** [15.11]** [1.27] [5.48]** [6.96]** [15.01]**
BOND MARKET 0.976 0.146 0.079 0.011 1.156 0.134
[6.44]** [10.91]** [1.16] [1.98]* [6.64]** [11.30]**
STOCK MARKET 1.32 0.171 0.273 0.008 1.599 0.164
[9.08]** [16.47]** [5.36]** [1.79] [9.07]** [17.83]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.92 0.069 0.537 0.039 0.622 0.011
[2.52]* [1.43] [2.21]* [1.92] [1.56] [0.25]
Observations 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
-1 -2 -3
Table 7
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership and firm value (Q)
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Tobin’s Q ; and
alternatively, ownership for all financial institutions (FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional investors (INST
INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-level control variables include log
total assets (LnTA), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation of weekly
returns(SD), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), and European industry Tobin’s Q median
(Q_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index
(LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock
market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006.
Financial and regulated firms are omitted (NACE 65-67 and 75). t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5%







logQ -0.076 -0.025 -0.043
[3.57]** [2.84]** [2.28]*
LnTA 0.055 0.02 0.032 0.008 0.046 0.014
[9.37]** [16.48]** [7.84]** [15.60]** [8.51]** [12.71]**
TURNOVER -0.018 -0.006 -0.017
[7.07]** [3.78]** [6.28]**
DY 0.639 0.341 0.564
[8.14]** [10.13]** [7.64]**
ROE -0.052 -0.028 -0.046
[9.74]** [11.88]** [9.44]**
SD -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
[6.78]** [8.64]** [6.89]**
BDR -0.487 -0.036 -0.44 0.008 -0.566 -0.043
[11.00]** [1.96] [13.26]** [1.05] [11.64]** [2.66]**
CASH 0.536 0.002 0.671 0.01 0.529 -0.01
[8.66]** [0.08] [17.01]** [0.94] [7.80]** [0.47]
CLOSE -0.014 -0.007 -0.01
[1.72] [2.33]* [1.46]
logQ_med 0.556 0.687 0.59
[10.87]** [20.09]** [11.01]**
AUDIT -0.159 -0.057 -0.075 -0.019 -0.141 -0.04
[6.21]** [8.46]** [4.52]** [6.67]** [5.35]** [6.70]**
LEGAL 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.004
[7.50]** [15.42]** [2.87]** [5.77]** [7.49]** [15.23]**
BOND MARKET 0.397 0.146 0.042 0.011 0.461 0.134
[6.67]** [10.93]** [1.51] [2.03]* [6.80]** [11.30]**
STOCK MARKET 0.542 0.173 0.122 0.009 0.643 0.165
[9.46]** [16.73]** [5.83]** [2.14]* [9.36]** [18.02]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.21 0.03 0.139 0.018 0.1 -0.016
[1.52] [0.65] [1.47] [0.97] [0.67] [0.38]
Observations 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 8
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of log Tobin’s Q
(log(Q); and alternatively, ownershipfor all financial institutions (FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional
investors (INST INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-level control
variables include log total assets (LnTA), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation
of weekly returns(SD), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), and European industry Tobin’s Q
median (logQ_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime
index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock
market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. t-
statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.
-1 -2 -3
Institutional ownership and firm value







ROA 0.01 0.002 0.01
[4.54]** [2.27]* [4.96]**
LnTA 2.341 0.011 2.518 0.006 1.976 0.005
[16.44]** [4.27]** [13.55]** [6.00]** [17.59]** [2.09]*
TURNOVER 0.014 0.007 0.009
[3.39]** [5.11]** [2.21]*
DY -0.011 -0.05 0.022
[0.14] [2.15]* [0.30]
ROE -0.263 -0.078 -0.247
[8.71]** [6.52]** [9.06]**
SD -0.006 -0.002 -0.004
[4.59]** [3.86]** [3.47]**
BDR -8.59 0.043 -4.08 0.026 -10.431 0.018
[7.69]** [2.24]* [2.67]** [3.38]** [10.23]** [1.06]
CASH -7.973 -0.052 -6.964 -0.018 -6.882 -0.032
[5.10]** [2.54]* [3.91]** [2.17]* [4.81]** [1.76]
CLOSE -0.06 -0.012 -0.057
[6.30]** [4.08]** [6.55]**
ROA_med 1.843 1.462 1.9
[11.17]** [7.66]** [12.25]**
AUDIT -2.791 -0.048 -2.778 -0.015 -1.687 -0.033
[4.29]** [7.10]** [3.65]** [5.34]** [3.00]** [5.38]**
LEGAL 0.224 0.005 0.055 0.001 0.183 0.004
[5.33]** [14.65]** [1.68] [4.97]** [4.64]** [14.41]**
BOND MARKET 9.248 0.139 2.377 0.01 8.32 0.127
[6.24]** [10.31]** [1.91] [1.76] [5.87]** [10.53]**
STOCK MARKET 11.702 0.14 2.648 0.001 11.23 0.136
[8.30]** [12.63]** [2.85]** [0.22] [7.88]** [13.68]**
year dummies
Constant -27.431 0.115 -21.494 0.026 -30.191 0.086
[8.02]** [2.13]* [5.18]** [1.21] [9.58]** [1.78]
Observations 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
-1 -2 -3
Table 9
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership and firm value (ROA)
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of ROA; and
alternatively, ownership for all financial institutions (FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional investors (INST
INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-level control variables include log
total assets (LnTA), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation of weekly
returns(SD), leverage (BDR), cash holdings (CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), and European industry ROA median
(ROA_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index
(LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock
market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. t-





INST INV -10.567 1.09
[14.59]** [11.74]**
Q -0.092 0.098 -0.039 0.105 -0.078 0.097
[25.00]** [18.26]** [22.24]** [20.99]** [22.73]** [16.52]**
BDR -2.477 -0.269 -1.836 -0.085 -3.12 -0.295
[7.98]** [6.49]** [6.73]** [4.83]** [9.81]** [7.94]**
LnTA 0.184 0.023 0.134 0.009 0.175 0.02
[14.89]** [18.45]** [13.17]** [17.60]** [15.59]** [17.93]**
TURNOVER -0.001 -0.002 0
[0.39] [1.77] [0.21]
DY 0.024 0.031 0.001
[0.46] [1.67] [0.02]
ROE -0.017 -0.01 -0.015
[6.25]** [9.55]** [5.85]**
SD -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
[2.86]** [2.52]* [3.33]**
CASH 0.9 0.065 -0.527 1.322 0.046 -0.55 0.826 0.047 -0.544
[4.55]** [2.57]* [25.18]** [8.44]** [4.45]** [26.23]** [4.04]** [2.11]* [24.93]**




Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (Q) and leverage
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of Tobin’s Q, leverage (BDR); and alternatively, ownershipfor all financial
institutions (FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional investors (INST INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-level
control variables include log total assets (LnTA), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation of weekly returns(SD), cash holdings (CASH),
closely held shares (CLOSE), European industry Tobin’s Q median (Q_med), fixed assets proportion (FA_TA), profitability (EBIT_TA), depreciation (DEP_TA) and European leverage
median (BDR_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond
market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to
2006. t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.Q FI BDR Q BANK BDR Q INST INV BDR
CLOSE 0.009 0.004 0.01
[1.46] [2.14]* [1.75]
FA_TA 0.148 0.136 0.158
[20.10]** [18.85]** [20.09]**
DEP_TA -0.278 -0.246 -0.309
[7.23]** [7.29]** [7.20]**
EBIT_TA -0.302 -0.288 -0.312
[18.25]** [19.35]** [17.24]**
BDR_med 0.518 0.493 0.543
[21.17]** [20.78]** [21.34]**
AUDIT -0.421 -0.046 0.093 -0.267 -0.015 0.085 -0.32 -0.028 0.085
[6.67]** [6.72]** [12.61]** [5.21]** [5.26]** [12.13]** [5.27]** [4.61]** [11.15]**
LEGAL 0.039 0.005 -0.006 0.009 0.001 -0.003 0.041 0.004 -0.006
[10.19]** [14.55]** [13.93]** [4.02]** [4.75]** [9.85]** [10.51]** [14.34]** [12.43]**
BOND MARKET 1.175 0.132 -0.215 0.112 0.007 -0.108 1.267 0.119 -0.231
[8.34]** [9.78]** [13.66]** [1.26] [1.27] [8.38]** [8.72]** [9.85]** [12.61]**
STOCK MARKET 1.661 0.186 -0.165 0.324 0.016 -0.033 1.889 0.177 -0.189
[12.92]** [18.29]** [11.38]** [5.01]** [3.88]** [3.38]** [13.51]** [19.59]** [10.35]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.058 0.078 -0.524 1.338 0.058 -0.596 0.214 -0.032 -0.426
[2.95]** [1.83] [11.69]** [4.37]** [3.32]** [13.13]** [0.60] [0.86] [9.56]**
Observations 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046 13046
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (Q) and leverage
-1 -2 -3





INST INV -3.947 0.945
[13.53]** [10.85]**
logQ -0.236 0.226 -0.103 0.251 -0.202 0.231
[28.86]** [17.58]** [26.89]** [21.37]** [26.36]** [16.57]**
BDR -1.308 -0.354 -0.998 -0.117 -1.556 -0.375
[10.49]** [8.55]** [8.66]** [6.75]** [12.41]** [10.06]**
LnTA 0.085 0.027 0.069 0.01 0.08 0.022
[16.51]** [21.06]** [16.05]** [20.03]** [17.37]** [20.29]**
TURNOVER -0.001 -0.001 0
[0.45] [1.20] [0.09]
DY 0.026 0.019 0.011
[0.52] [1.16] [0.22]
ROE -0.019 -0.01 -0.018
[7.10]** [9.85]** [6.85]**
SD -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
[3.47]** [2.98]** [3.90]**
CASH 0.208 0.027 -0.507 0.393 0.034 -0.537 0.178 0.015 -0.528
[2.60]** [1.08] [25.13]** [5.86]** [3.29]** [26.59]** [2.21]* [0.65] [25.06]**
logQ_med 0.191 0.247 0.221
[5.83]** [8.60]** [6.89]**
Table 11
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (logQ) and leverage
-1 -2 -3
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of log Tobin’s Q (log(Q), leverage (BDR); and alternatively, ownership for all
financial institutions (FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional investors (INST INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares.
Firm-level control variables include log total assets (LnTA), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation of weekly returns(SD), cash holdings
(CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), European industry log Tobin’s Q median (logQ_med), fixed assets proportion (FA_TA), profitability (EBIT_TA), depreciation (DEP_TA) and European
leverage median (BDR_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the
private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is
from 1997 to 2006. t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.logQ FI BDR logQ BANK BDR logQ INST INV BDR
CLOSE 0.007 0.004 0.008
[1.02] [2.01]* [1.33]
FA_TA 0.151 0.142 0.161
[20.96]** [19.78]** [20.93]**
DEP_TA -0.3 -0.28 -0.331
[7.69]** [8.12]** [7.62]**
EBIT_TA -0.323 -0.315 -0.337
[17.98]** [19.49]** [17.21]**
BDR_med 0.536 0.517 0.564
[22.03]** [22.03]** [22.16]**
AUDIT -0.156 -0.044 0.087 -0.108 -0.014 0.082 -0.113 -0.027 0.081
[6.13]** [6.49]** [12.38]** [4.96]** [5.04]** [12.01]** [4.75]** [4.38]** [11.05]**
LEGAL 0.016 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.016 0.004 -0.006
[9.94]** [15.00]** [13.58]** [4.73]** [5.22]** [10.30]** [10.18]** [14.72]** [12.15]**
BOND MARKET 0.437 0.129 -0.198 0.04 0.006 -0.108 0.458 0.115 -0.213
[7.66]** [9.52]** [13.19]** [1.05] [1.04] [8.56]** [7.95]** [9.56]** [12.20]**
STOCK MARKET 0.651 0.188 -0.144 0.141 0.017 -0.033 0.722 0.18 -0.167
[12.39]** [18.59]** [10.47]** [5.10]** [4.19]** [3.40]** [12.92]** [19.91]** [9.64]**
year dummies
Constant 0.067 -0.024 -0.425 0.269 0.018 -0.498 -0.219 -0.111 -0.348
[0.47] [0.56] [10.24]** [2.13]* [1.06] [11.63]** [1.59] [2.97]** [8.42]**
Observations 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025 13025
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
-1 -2 -3
Table 11
Institutional ownership and firm value





INST INV -95.192 0.473
[11.66]** [7.75]**
ROA -0.009 0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0
[12.52]** [0.45] [4.62]** [3.59]** [13.62]** [1.50]
BDR -23.958 -0.206 -27.599 0.008 -29.664 -0.262
[7.59]** [4.76]** [10.71]** [0.44] [8.69]** [6.78]**
LnTA 2.994 0.037 2.093 0.01 2.981 0.032
[22.77]** [26.26]** [20.28]** [17.67]** [22.90]** [25.74]**
TURNOVER 0.003 0.004 0.003
[1.37] [4.13]** [1.30]
DY -0.092 -0.058 -0.11
[1.69] [3.12]** [2.11]*
ROE -0.017 -0.01 -0.014
[1.64] [1.85] [1.65]
SD -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[2.87]** [4.62]** [2.07]*
CASH -15.886 -0.168 -0.301 -12.92 -0.026 -0.298 -17.317 -0.157 -0.322
[8.32]** [6.47]** [19.30]** [9.50]** [2.47]* [15.92]** [8.19]** [6.80]** [22.18]**




Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (ROA) and leverage
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of ROA, leverage (BDR); and alternatively, ownership for all financial institutions
(FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional investors (INST INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. Firm-level control
variables include log total assets (LnTA), turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation of weekly returns(SD), cash holdings (CASH), closely held
shares (CLOSE), European industry ROA median (ROA_med), fixed assets proportion (FA_TA), profitability (EBIT_TA), depreciation (DEP_TA) and European leverage median (BDR_med). 
All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (BOND
MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 1997 to 2006. t-statistics are in
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.ROA FI BDR ROA BANK BDR ROA INST INV BDR
CLOSE -0.004 -0.001 0.003
[0.55] [0.45] [0.48]
FA_TA 0.125 0.105 0.131
[20.15]** [15.09]** [21.02]**
DEP_TA -0.202 -0.143 -0.211
[4.24]** [2.57]* [4.54]**
BDR_med 0.48 0.412 0.484
[22.81]** [18.37]** [23.35]**
AUDIT -2.815 -0.043 0.064 0.214 -0.015 0.069 -2.277 -0.025 0.058
[4.53]** [6.21]** [10.81]** [0.46] [5.31]** [9.85]** [3.60]** [4.05]** [10.42]**
LEGAL 0.256 0.004 -0.003 -0.052 0.001 -0.002 0.305 0.003 -0.003
[6.63]** [12.63]** [10.26]** [2.62]** [4.29]** [7.78]** [7.21]** [12.31]** [9.72]**
BOND MARKET 9.591 0.136 -0.142 -0.59 0.011 -0.092 11.438 0.121 -0.14
[6.84]** [10.00]** [11.22]** [0.78] [1.92] [7.10]** [7.35]** [10.00]** [10.89]**
STOCK MARKET 13.444 0.178 -0.073 1.908 0.008 -0.007 16.655 0.173 -0.074
[10.45]** [17.52]** [6.56]** [3.53]** [1.96]* [0.76] [10.98]** [19.05]** [6.06]**
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -30.923 -0.314 -0.201 -32.524 -0.041 -0.297 -36.268 -0.378 -0.131
[9.37]** [7.27]** [6.05]** [12.87]** [2.33]* [7.00]** [10.12]** [9.77]** [4.46]**
Observations 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996 12996
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (ROA) and leverage
-1 -2 -3





INST INV -4.673 -0.118
[6.38]** [1.16]
Q -0.086 0.04 -0.037 0.059 -0.071 0.019
[12.48]** [6.38]** [12.53]** [10.58]** [11.40]** [3.00]**
BDR -1.596 -0.156 -1.147 -0.018 -1.982 -0.206
[5.67]** [2.92]** [4.38]** [0.83] [6.82]** [4.29]**
lLnTA 0.07 0.017 0.014 0.053 0.007 0.01 0.059 0.012 0.016
[5.64]** [9.90]** [10.14]** [5.08]** [9.29]** [6.69]** [5.28]** [7.56]** [14.45]**
lTURNOVER -0.008 0.004 -0.011
[2.02]* [2.19]* [3.07]**
lDY 0.367 0.026 0.373
[4.11]** [0.74] [4.52]**
lROE -0.021 -0.006 -0.019
[3.96]** [2.77]** [3.87]**
lSD -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
[4.27]** [5.19]** [3.03]**
lCASH 1.546 0.112 -0.407 1.748 0.063 -0.441 1.441 0.077 -0.366
[9.55]** [3.64]** [20.80]** [12.79]** [5.01]** [22.49]** [8.50]** [2.80]** [18.40]**




Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (Q) and leverage with lagged firm variables
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the annual time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of ROA, leverage (MDR); and alternatively, ownership for all financial institutions
(FI) in system 1, banks (BANK) in system 2 and institutional investors (INST INV) in system 3. The system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares. All firm-level control
variables are lagged one period and include log total assets (LnTA), the lag of turnover (TURNOVER), dividend yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), standard deviation of weekly returns(SD),
cash holdings (CASH), closely held shares (CLOSE), European industry ROA median (ROA_med), fixed assets proportion (FA_TA), profitability (EBIT_TA), depreciation (DEP_TA) and
European leverage median (BDR_med). All regressions include the country-level regressors strength of auditing and reporting (AUDIT), legal regime index (LEGAL), market capitalization of
the private bond market to GDP (BOND MARKET), and market capitalization of the stock market to GDP (STOCK MARKET). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample
period is from 1997 to 2006. t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in boldface.Q FI BDR Q BANK BDR Q INST INV BDR
lCLOSE -0.033 -0.006 -0.024
[3.31]** [1.49] [2.78]**
lFA_TA 0.129 0.127 0.124
[17.01]** [16.43]** [15.89]**
lDEP_TA -0.277 -0.267 -0.253
[5.91]** [6.00]** [5.09]**
lEBIT_TA -0.211 -0.2 -0.199
[11.91]** [12.03]** [10.62]**
lBDR_med 0.426 0.428 0.409
[17.61]** [18.26]** [17.04]**
AUDIT -0.229 -0.054 0.035 -0.191 -0.021 0.05 -0.167 -0.032 0.026
[3.94]** [6.26]** [5.09]** [3.75]** [5.97]** [7.26]** [3.09]** [4.14]** [4.16]**
LEGAL 0.016 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.017 0.004 -0.001
[4.65]** [11.42]** [4.96]** [2.25]* [4.67]** [8.86]** [4.86]** [10.84]** [2.74]**
BOND MARKET 0.589 0.141 -0.089 0.186 0.017 -0.092 0.615 0.122 -0.059
[4.75]** [9.24]** [5.82]** [2.43]* [2.73]** [9.11]** [4.89]** [8.86]** [3.62]**
STOCK MARKET 0.809 0.172 -0.006 0.208 0.005 0.004 0.956 0.173 0.03
[6.69]** [13.34]** [0.37] [3.52]** [0.93] [0.54] [6.99]** [14.89]** [1.62]
Constant 1.093 0.252 -0.341 1.049 0.125 -0.424 0.834 0.151 -0.284
[3.35]** [4.36]** [8.82]** [3.58]** [5.31]** [10.50]** [2.57]* [2.91]** [7.61]**
Observations 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Institutional ownership and firm value
System of ownership, firm value (Q) and leverage with lagged firm variables
-1 -2 -3
Table 13Variable Definition Source
FI % of total shareholding where 
shareholders are financial 
institutions
Amadeus
BANK % of total shareholding where 
shareholders are bank trust
Amadeus
INST INV Percentage of total shareholding 




Q (Total assets + market value 
(Datastream item MV) - Book equity) 
/ total assets
Amadeus + Datastream
Q_med The firm's industry median Q (using 
the Fama and French industry 
classification)
Amadeus + Datastream
LnTA Size of the firm : log of the ratio of 
total assets to cpi
Amadeus
BDR Current liability loans + long term 
debt / Total assets
Amadeus
BDR_med The firm's industry median debt ratio 
(using the Fama and French industry 
classification)
Amadeus
DY Dividend yield  (Datastream item DY) Datastream
ROE Return on equity  (Datastream item 
ROE)
Datastream
ROA Return on assets (WorldScope item 
08326)
Worldscope
TURNOVER Annual share volume (Datastream 
item VO) divided by adjusted shares 
outstanding (Datastream items 
NOSH/AF)
Worldscope
CLOSE Number of shares held by insiders 
as a proportion of the number of 
shares outstanding (WorldScope 
item 08021)
Worldscope
SD standard deviation of one year of € 
weekly returns (Datastream items 
RI)
Datastream
CASH Cash and Cash equivalent / Total 
assets
Amadeus
EBIT_TA Ebit / Total assets Amadeus
MB (Current liability loans + long term 
debt + market value of firm) / Total 
assets
Amadeus + Datastream
DEP_TA Depreciation / Total assets Amadeus
A. Ownership variables
Appendix A
Definitions of the variablesVariable Definition Source
FA_TA Fixed tangible assets / Total assets Amadeus
AUDIT Strenght of auditing and reportings 
standards regarding company 
financial performance
Global competitiveness report
LEGAL Anti-director rights multiplied by the 
rule of law index 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998)
BOND the ratio of private domestic debt 
securities issued by financial 
institutions and corporations as a 
share of GDP
World Bank
STOCK the value of listed shares to GDP World Bank
C. Country-specific variables
Appendix A
Definitions of the variablesShareholder Type Freq. Percent Cum.
Bank 20477 12.85 12.85
Employees/Managers 742 0.47 13.31
Financial company 22361 14.03 27.34
Foundation 534 0.34 27.68
Foundation/Research Institute 22 0.01 27.69
Individual(s) or family(ies) 47703 29.93 57.62
Industrial company 18838 11.82 69.44
Insurance company 10965 6.88 76.32
Mutual & Pension fund/Trust/Nominee 26815 16.82 93.14
Unknown 4346 2.73 95.87
Other unnamed shareholders 841 0.53 96.4
Private Equity firms 1819 1.14 97.54
Private individuals / private shareholders 9 0.01 97.54
Public 1973 1.24 98.78
Self-owned 827 0.52 99.3
State, Public authority 591 0.37 99.67
Unnamed private shareholders 526 0.33 100
Total 159,389 100
year FI BANK INST INV
1997 41.22 9.54 32.45
1998 32.27 7.47 25.32
1999 29.24 6.75 22.9
2000 26.42 5.94 20.81
2001 18.02 3.68 14.35
2002 17.69 3.2 14.52
2003 18.31 3.23 15.12
2004 18.71 3.3 15.45
2005 23.67 3.97 19.77
2006 31.43 6.7 25.18
 
Total 24.73 5.09 19.88
Appendix B